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Much of the economics and political sci-
ence literature on wars and conflict has 
focused on things that policymakers have 
difficulties changing. While this essay will 
also touch upon these, the focus clearly 
lies on the items that policymakers can 
affect. Reading the following pages will 
make you realize that getting the institu-
tions and policies right can bring peace 
and prosperity, while getting them wrong 
can bring war and destruction.
The author begins with a historic over-
view of the evolution of conflicts around 
the world. How have different types of 
conflicts been distributed between 
regions? How has their frequency evolved 
and how has the prevailing typology been 
changing over time? Next, the author 
focuses on the costs of wars and their 
impact on human lives, explaining why 
wars are a major obstacle to growth and 
development.
A major part of this essay is dedicated to 
defining the main drivers for conflict. The 
economic and political science literature 
on conflict has been booming in the last 
decades, and a series of important drivers 
of conflict have been identified. The fac-
tors that have been found to matter sub-
stantially for political violence range from 
asymmetries in recourse holdings to eth-
nic and religious diversity, as well as to 
income levels and demographics. 
Having outlined the different factors of 
risk, the author consequently presents a 
number of institutions and policies that 
have the potential to reduce the risk of 
conflict. Using the “Swiss model” as a 
template, for instance, could well inspire 
political reforms in divided and war-torn 
societies. 
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When it comes to peace and understand-
ing, the 20th century was a mixed bas-
ket. On the dark side, politically 
motivated violence led to two World 
Wars, mass killings, and purges carried 
out by a series of totalitarian regimes, as 
well as of dozens of recurrent ethnic civil 
wars that took place mostly in poor 
countries. Furthermore, the resurgence of 
terrorism has become a major problem. 
Overall, conflict-related violence has led 
to unimaginable human suffering and to 
a death toll of over 100 million human 
lives.1  
But there is also a bright side: For the 
first time for centuries, much of Europe 
has been at peace since 1946, and the 
creation of the European Union has 
brought many traditional foes and ene-
mies closer together. There has also been 
an impressive spread of democracy 
around the world, which can be one of 
the strongest warrants against political 
violence under some circumstances. 
There has also been a massive increase in 
prosperity around the world, which is 
also one of the pillars of peace.
Much of the economics and political sci-
ence literature on wars and conflict has 
focused on things that are hard for poli-
cymakers to change (natural resources, 
ethnic composition, weather shocks), 
and this essay will also touch on them. 
However, I will devote much attention to 
things that policymakers can affect. Get-
ting the institutions and policies right 
can bring peace and prosperity, while 
getting it wrong can bring war and 
destruction.
Introduction
5When being asked about wars, most peo-
ple today spontaneously think of civil  
conflict between opposing ethnic or reli-
gious groups in Africa or the Middle 
East. While there have indeed been sev-
eral recent, heavily mediatized instances 
of internal political violence in these 
regions of the world, the patterns of con-
flict have evolved over time; countries 
where fighting seems unthinkable today 
were at the forefront of bloody wars in 
the past.
History of Wars
 Figure 1 displays the cumulated number 
of battle-related combat deaths from 
inter-state wars for each country during 
the period 1816 to 2007. Without sur-
prise, the protagonist powers during 
World War I and World War II suffer 
from a particularly large death toll. This 
is the case for much of Western Europe, 
the Balkans, the United States of Amer-
ica, Russia (resp. the Soviet Union), Tur-
key (resp. the Ottoman Empire), Japan, 
and China. Moreover, a series of regional 
Cumulated number of battle-related combatant fatalities per country
Source: Correlates of War
Fig. 1  Inter-State War Battle Deaths from 1816 to 2007
> 1’000’000 battle deaths
100’000 – 1’000’000 battle deaths
10’000 – 100’000 battle deaths
1’000 – 10’000 battle deaths
< 1’000 battle deaths
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conflicts are reflected by high fatality 
numbers, such as the several wars involv-
ing Brazil in the 19th century, the Iran-
Iraq wars, or the India-Pakistan conflict 
in Kashmir. When it comes to combat 
deaths in inter-state wars in the last two 
centuries, Africa has been relatively less 
heavily affected than other parts of the 
world.
The picture is somewhat different, how-
ever, when focusing on civil wars. Espe-
cially in recent years, Africa (and among 
others the Great Lakes Region) has suf-
fered from an important death toll from 
civil conflict.  Figure 2 displays the num-
ber of fatalities occurring in civil wars in 
different countries around the world 
between 1816 and 2007. Strikingly, the 
death toll of the American Civil War 
from 1861 to 1865 and the battle deaths 
of the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 
1939 are both important. Also, the Rus-
sian revolution, as well as various epi-
sodes of civil fighting in China, have 
weighted heavily.
The data from the Correlates of War (a 
leading conflict data platform founded by 
academics) used in Figures 1 and 2 had 
the advantage of containing long time 
series, which was ideal for getting the big 
picture. It is important to also bear in 
mind some downsides of this type of 
death toll data: In more developed coun-
tries, casualties are more likely to be 
recorded, making them appear relatively 
more violent than they are compared to 
less developed areas. Further, countries 
that are older also accumulate more fatal-
ities in this data than recently founded 
countries.2
Total number of battle deaths per country
Source: Correlates of War
Fig. 2  Civil War Battle Deaths from 1816 to 2007 
Least 
Most
7In order to capture more recent evolutions 
and for having more details on war types, 
we need to make use of another major 
source of civil war data, the data collected 
by Uppsala University and the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (UCDP-PRIO), 
covering the time period from 1946 to 
2014.
Figure 3 first shows the relative impor-
tance of different types of conflict over 
1946–2014, defining as conflict an event 
with at least 25 battle deaths. While 
“Internal Conflict” corresponds to classic 
civil wars without outside intervention, 
such as the notorious Rwandan genocide 
and civil war of 1994, “Internationalized 
Internal Conflict” captures civil wars that 
escalate into international wars, such as 
the Second Congo War that broke out in 
1998 and was later referred to as the 
“Great War of Africa” or “Africa’s World 
War” due to the involvement of a whole 
series of neighboring states. “Interstate 
Conflict” refers to fighting between states, 
such as the Iran-Iraq wars, while the 
notion of “Extrasystemic Conflict” stands 
for colonial liberation wars, such as the 
Algerian War of Independence against 
France between 1954 and 1962. As 
becomes clear from Figure 3, civil wars 
make up the lion’s share of conflicts in this 
period.  
Furthermore, the evolution over time of 
the numbers of conflicts taking place 
around the world in a given year is impor-
tant. Figure 4 on page 8 draws on the 
same data source as Figure 3, but displays 
the evolution of different types of conflicts 
over time. We can easily see that many 
extrasystemic (colonial) wars were fought 
right after World War II, when decoloniza-
tion was in full motion. Since then, the 
importance of this category of conflict has 
sharply declined. While interstate wars 
have been relatively rare events through-
out the post-WW II period, civil wars have 
become more and more important, peak-
ing after the fall of the Berlin Wall, where 
violent wars were fought out in many 
nascent democracies of the former Eastern 
Extrasystemic 
Conflict
Interstate 
Conflict
Internationalized 
Internal Conflict
Internal Conflict
Source: UCDP-PRIO
77.2%
11.7%
5.6%
5.4%
Fig. 3  
Relative Importance 
of Conflict Types, 
1946–2014 
In percent of total conflict
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Fig. 4 Evolution of Conflict Types over Time
Bloc and the Balkans. Since then, the num-
ber of civil wars has somewhat declined, 
but is still at a shockingly high level. 
Many of the current conflicts take place in 
Africa and the Middle East. There has also 
been a trend towards a larger risk of esca-
lation into internationalized civil wars.
9Cost of Wars 
The impact of war on human lives is 
deep and takes on various forms: War 
kills, war favors diseases, war destroys 
social structures, and war impoverishes, 
to name a few.
First and foremost, there is a huge direct 
cost of various forms of conflict in terms 
of human lives: As mentioned above, the 
total death toll from different forms of 
conflict during the 20th century lies 
above 100 million human lives. An esti-
mated 15 million military and 35 million 
civilian fatalities were recorded in World 
War II alone.³ Violence has also been 
omnipresent since 1945. Between 1945 
and the end of the 20th century, an esti-
mated 3.3 million people lost their lives 
in 25 inter-state wars, while an estimated 
16.2 million people perished in 127 civil 
wars. Much violence also occurs away 
from the battlefield, when armed troops 
turn their weapons against defenseless 
civilians. Since World War II, some 50 
episodes of mass killings have led to 
between 12 and 25 million civilian casu-
alties,4 in many cases involving govern-
ments attacking political or ethnic 
minority groups among the population, 
as for example during the infamous 
Stalinist purges, the massacres committed 
by the Red Khmer in Cambodia, and, 
more recently, the ethnic cleansing in 
Sudan’s Darfur region.
And even when the shooting of the guns 
finally gives way to silence, the dying 
continues, as epidemics and diseases hit-
ting the weakened populations during 
post-war reconstruction cause at least as 
many fatalities as direct casualties.5 
The casualties from conflict, however, are 
only one part of the story. Conflicts also 
cause lifelong injuries, create large refu-
gee flows, and inflict fear and psychologi-
cal suffering. Terrorism, for example, 
results in fewer fatalities than inter-state 
or civil wars, but creates an atmosphere 
of fear that strongly affects the way peo-
ple live their lives.
While wars may be “good business” for a 
small number of firms (such as weapon 
manufacturers), they cause an important 
loss of economic welfare for the society 
as a whole. The renowned Oxford-econ-
omist Sir Paul Collier estimates that civil 
wars slow down economic growth by 2.3 
percentage points per year, implying that 
a typical seven-year long civil war would 
leave a country 15 percent poorer at the 
end of the war. Taking the direct and 
indirect costs of a civil war into account, 
as well as spillovers to neighboring states, 
Collier estimates the cost of a typical civil 
war at around $ 64 billion.6 
Not only major internationalized civil 
wars, such as the Second Congo War 
breaking out in 1998  in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and killing 
millions since then, have a major impact 
on the economy (see box on page 10). 
Even comparatively mild forms of civil 
wars and terrorism, such as the conflicts 
in the Basque Country and in Northern 
Ireland leave crucial footprints on the 
local economy. When estimating the 
costs of terrorism in the Basque country 
between 1955 and 1995 by comparing it 
to a weighted average of comparable 
Spanish regions, one finds that Basque 
GDP would be 10% higher today if 
ETA’s armed struggle had not occurred.7
Given these very substantial economic 
costs of armed violence, it is not surpris-
ing that wars are a major obstacle to 
growth and development: According to 
the OECD,8 20 of the world’s 34 poorest 
countries are affected by armed conflict. 
In contrast, civil wars are extremely rare 
events in the richest countries of the 
10
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world, and even when conflicts occasion-
ally break out in developed regions, like 
in the Basque Country or Northern Ire-
land, the death toll is substantially lower 
than for full-blown civil wars like the 
Second Congo War. One of course has to 
bear in mind that causality runs both 
ways – wars make countries poorer and 
poorer countries are more likely to be 
dragged into a war.
It is of course important to bear in mind 
that the costs of conflict are not just lim-
ited to death tolls and economic losses. In 
addition, conflict can drive down trust 
between ethnic groups (as discussed fur-
ther below), limit access to education, 
imperil civic norms and political institu-
tions, and have long-run detrimental 
effects on physical and mental health. 
While there are few reliable numbers on 
the effects of conflict on things like social 
norms and political institutions, case 
studies for particular countries find 
shockingly large negative impacts on edu-
cation and health. For mental health, for 
example, the estimates vary widely 
between studies and the severity of the 
war context. Traumatization rates 
reported by major studies range between 
a fifth and over 90 percent, which is 
extremely worrying by any standards.9
© UNHCR/Christa Barnes
Major internationalized civil wars, such as the Second Congo War start-
ing in 1998 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where mil-
lions have been killed since, have a major impact on the economy. The 
picture above shows Congolese refugees returning home from neigh-
boring Zambia in 2009 aboard the ferry Liemba. Because of political 
violence in parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, tens of thou-
sands of refugees fled to neighboring countries in the last few decades.
Many went to Zambia, but as conditions stabilized in the southern part 
of DRC, UNHCR launched a major repatriation project, helping at least 
40,000 Congolese to return home.
Some of them travelled across Lake Tanganyika aboard the Liemba 
ferry, a very famous ship built in 1913 by then German forces in their 
Tanganyika colony. The ship, renamed the Luisa, became the star of a 
famous Hollywood movie, The African Queen.
Source: UNHCR – The UN Refugee Agency
Coming Home from Zambia
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Factors of Risk: Ethnicity, Natural 
Resources, and Poverty
Ethnic Turmoil
The economic and political science litera-
ture on conflict has been booming in the 
last decades and a series of important 
drivers of conflict have been identified. 
First of all, ethnic and religious diversity 
has been found to be a main driver of 
conflict. Clashes between ethnic groups 
fueled a series of recent African conflicts. 
Most prominently, the Hutu-Tutsi hostili-
ties peaked in the horrors of the Rwan-
dan genocide, where Hutu Interahamwe 
fighters slaughtered almost a million of 
ordinary Tutsi co-citizens within 100 
days. The Hutu-Tutsi rivalry has also led 
to an explosion of violence in neighbor-
ing states, such as the Congo Wars and 
several episodes of fighting and massa-
cres in Burundi. Ethnic and religious divi-
sions have also been fueling the fighting 
in Uganda, Sudan, and Nigeria, just to 
name a few.
Similarly, the Sunni-Shia clashes have 
kept violence high in the Arabic penin-
sula and the entire Middle East. The 
Iran-Iraq wars, the various civil wars in 
Yemen, the wars in Lebanon and more 
recently in Syria have all had a Sunni-
Shia dimension, with both the Shia major 
power Iran and the major power from 
the Sunni side, Saudi Arabia, at various 
times being accused of meddling in the 
regional wars. 
Long ago, economists started to look for 
a synthetic measure allowing the capture 
of ethnic diversity. The obvious starting 
point was the catchall measure of ethnic 
fractionalization, very popular in devel-
opment economics. Roughly speaking, 
the more ethnic groups there are in a 
given country, the larger its ethnic frac-
tionalization score becomes. A country 
like Norway or Portugal that is ethnically 
very homogenous would have low values, 
while a country like Benin or Tanzania, 
with a large number of ethnic groups, 
would have large ethnic fractionalization 
scores. These first studies, however, failed 
to detect a strong correlation between 
this measure and conflict.10 It turned out, 
in fact, that countries with many ethnic 
groups were much less at risk of unrest 
than those with fewer, but larger groups, 
such as  Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, or 
Guatemala. There was thus a need to 
come up with a novel synthetic measure 
tailored to capture conflict-relevant cleav-
ages: A series of Barcelona-based econo-
mists have developed a very simple, yet 
powerful measure of relevant ethnic 
diversity, labelled “ethnic polarization.” 
This indicator also ranges between 0 and 
1, but is largest for countries with very 
few groups of similar size, while both 
ethnically homogenous countries and 
countries with a large number of tiny 
groups receive small scores. This measure 
has proven to be a powerful predictor of 
conflict, with ethnically polarized coun-
tries being at much larger conflict risk.11
The Resource Curse
Some decades ago, economists noticed 
that many resource-rich countries are 
poor. The initial explanations at hand 
were of macroeconomic type, notably the 
“Dutch disease” argument, according to 
which resource windfalls increase domes-
tic prices to such an extent that the local 
industry loses competitiveness and the 
country ultimately impoverishes. The evi-
dence for this has been mixed, and hence 
the literature has turned its attention to 
natural resources destroying government 
and leading to “rentier” societies or 
petro-states. While this is surely part of 
the explanation for the relatively weak 
track record of many countries with 
12
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abundant natural resources, it has been 
increasingly recognized that a higher risk 
of conflict explains a big part of the 
“resource curse.” There is now substan-
tial evidence that some resources are par-
ticularly conducive to political instability, 
namely oil, diamonds, precious metals, 
and coca. Another piece of bad news is 
that the resource manna not only fuels 
civil wars between armed groups; we also 
observe that the government’s likelihood 
to massacre its own civilians and inter-
state wars are more likely in the presence 
of important resource deposits. 
The channels that fuel the conflict-induc-
ing impact of Mother Nature’s riches are 
manifold as well. First, and most obvi-
ously, it becomes more lucrative to con-
quer a place with more valuable stuff to 
grab. It is not by accident that Iraq’s Sad-
dam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait, 
which has huge oil reserves per capita, 
rather than some poorer neighbor state. 
Moreover, the desire to control valuable 
mineral deposits has arguably fueled the 
various wars in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and the corresponding interna-
tional interventions.
This rent-grabbing mechanism, however, 
is not the only story. Another important 
reason why oil and other resources can be 
dangerous for peace is that they are often 
not evenly distributed in a given country. 
It is hence not only the total amount of 
natural resources that matters, but how 
they are distributed over the territory.12 
The most harmless example of oil wealth 
of minority regions driving secessionist 
movements is Scotland, where the inde-
pendence cause became significantly 
more powerful after large oil deposits 
were found. Unfortunately, separatist 
tensions are not always as peacefully 
resolved as in Scotland’s case. In contrast, 
separatist movements in Aceh (Indone-
sia), Timor-Leste (ex-Indonesia), the 
Niger-Delta (Nigeria), South Sudan, 
Yemen, Kurdistan (Iraq), among many 
others, have paid a high price for aspiring 
independence. The national governments 
have been keen to maintain their grip on 
their “crown jewels.” and bloody repres-
sion and fighting were often the conse-
quence. 
Asymmetries in resource holdings have 
also been drivers of various militarized 
interstate disputes in the past decades.13 
It turns out that situations where both 
countries in a country pair have impor-
tant oil holdings entail a similarly small 
risk of conflict  as situations where 
nobody holds oil. The reason is simple: If 
both countries are very oil rich, both can 
grab something in case of victory but also 
have much to lose in case of defeat. In 
contrast, if only one country in the coun-
try pair has important oil deposits while 
the other one is oil poor, the incentives of 
the oil-poor country to invade its rich 
neighbor are relatively large. As shown in 
recent research, this effect is magnified if 
the oil holdings of the oil-rich nation are 
close to the bilateral border. In this case, 
conquering relatively little territory pro-
vides the resource-poor state with control 
of valuable resources, while it has very 
little to lose after defeat. In fact, even a 
resource-rich country can have incentives 
to attack another resource-rich state, pro-
vided that the target has its oil close to 
the bilateral border and hence in closer 
reach. This logic is consistent with Sad-
dam Hussein’s move on Kuwait, as 
Kuwait’s oil was very close to the Iraqi 
border, while an Iraqi defeat was first of 
all improbable and second, much of 
Iraq’s oil is in the Northern Kurdistan 
The most dangerous situation is 
when most natural resource fields 
are concentrated in the ethnic 
homelands of ethnic minority 
groups that would be economically 
better off if they were to split from 
the rest of the country. 
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region, far away from the Southern bor-
der with Kuwait. 
Besides fueling the risk of civil and inter-
state wars between armed groups, oil has 
also been found to make massacres of 
civilians more lucrative for cynical gov-
ernments.14 The underlying channel is as 
follows: By killing part of its own peo-
ple, a ruthless group in power is able to 
foster its grip on power and hence able 
to capture a larger share of the economic 
output of a country. At the same time, 
the total production of a country falls 
after massacres, given that the workforce 
is decimated. It has been shown in recent 
research that in a productive country 
without many natural resources, such as 
Switzerland, this trade-off is clear-cut, 
and it is never worthwhile for a popula-
tion group to kill co-citizens of other 
ethnicities, as the “pie” to grab shrinks 
faster than their appropriated share of it 
increases. However, the situation is very 
different in petro-states and other econo-
mies relying mostly on natural resource 
rents. It has been found that the horrible 
logic outlined above can apply in these 
situations, and ruthless groups in power 
can increase their per capita rents by kil-
ling other ethnic groups. The reason is 
that the economic output – mostly made 
up by natural resources – does not 
depend very much on the population 
size, and resource wells are only rarely 
destroyed in combat. Hence, while the 
total size of the “pie” to grab changes 
only little, the cynical group in power 
can substantially increase its share. Nat-
ural resources, unfortunately, do not 
only fuel wars between armed groups 
but can also trigger more massacres of 
helpless civilians. A very sad example of 
this has been the ethnic cleansing in 
resource-rich Sudan, or Saddam Husse-
in’s attacks on civilians living in oil-rich 
Kurdistan.
The bad news continues, as natural 
resource rents not only increase the like-
lihood of political violence, but also its 
diffusion and length. According to the 
“feasibility hypothesis,” resource money 
not only constitutes the “prize” or “pie” 
to appropriate, but also helps pay for the 
fighting while it happens. In the absence 
of perfect capital markets, looting of 
resource rents allows rebels to fund their 
cause, expand their zone of activity, and 
spread violence over a greater area and 
for a longer time.
While funding a rebel group strong 
enough to be able to challenge the state 
is hard in countries with large state 
capacity and few natural resources, it is 
the opposite case in weak states with 
much easily accessible resource money. 
A very sad example is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, where a series of 
wars have taken place in the last 
decades. Most notoriously, the Second 
Congo War started in 1998, and fighting 
has never fully ceased since then. Several 
million people have already perished, 
and the fighting intensity remains shock-
ingly high. The fact that the country is 
particularly resource rich has been a key 
factor in allowing several dozens of dis-
tinct armed militias to keep up the 
fight.15
In addition to these direct effects, there 
are also several indirect ways in which 
natural resources boost the conflict risk 
by undermining the state and the econ-
omy. To start with, “rentier states” have 
less of a need to build up fiscal capacity 
and a tax collection apparatus than other 
states, and hence they tend to become 
weaker states with less state capacity and 
less efficient bureaucracies.16 While 
petro-states may be able to cope and 
fund the administration and army in the 
short run while the oil money is still 
flowing, these states may later – once oil 
wells have been pumped empty – be left 
poor and disenfranchised of a strong 
bureaucracy with tax collection capacity. 
Of course, this has direct implications on 
the ability to fight rebels, which becomes 
a mission impossible when being unable 
to rely on a well-funded and well-
equipped national army. Think for 
14
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example of the almost complete absence 
of state and reigning anarchy in oil-rich 
Libya post-Ghaddafi. 
Another devastating factor frequently 
strikes the economy of resource-rich 
states. By their very nature, natural 
resource exploitation often requires huge 
amounts of capital. It has been found 
that price spikes in natural resource and 
other capital-intensive sectors act like a 
magnet in attracting capital and workers 
from more labor-intensive sectors such as 
agriculture, which then start to shrink. 
As the booming capital-intensive indus-
tries are not able to absorb all labor 
flowing in, wages start to drop. This, in 
turn, has a direct impact on conflict and 
criminal activities, as armed rebellion is 
typically labor-intensive in most countries 
(requiring “boots on the ground”). 
Hence, a drop in wages makes it cheaper 
to hire rebel soldiers, which can lead to 
an escalation of political turmoil. This 
result has been demonstrated both theo-
retically and empirically in Colombia. A 
team of NYU-based scholars has shown 
that price increases in the capital-intensive 
oil sector fuel fighting activity by the 
FARC and other armed groups, while 
price spikes in the labor-intensive coffee 
production have the inverse conflict-
dampening effect.17
Better Pay, Lower Risk
One striking stylized fact is that conflicts 
in the past decades have almost exclu-
sively taken place in poor countries, with 
two rare counter-examples being the 
untypical religious / ethnic tensions in 
Northern Ireland and the Basque country. 
Hence, the natural question arises 
whether there is something about being 
rich that acts as rampart against political 
violence. It turns out that an important 
factor affecting the conflict risk is indeed 
the level of income from productive work. 
The logic is simple: When productive 
work yields lower incomes, temptation 
goes up to try making a living from illicit 
activities. Unemployed factory workers 
and struggling peasants without savings 
or earnings to lose are easier to recruit 
than those running a thriving farm or 
benefitting from a well-paid job, and who 
would face a higher opportunity cost of 
giving up the plow for the rifle. 
For many years, political scientists and 
economists have documented the positive 
correlation between poverty and fighting. 
These results have, however, been hard to 
interpret, as the causality can run both 
ways. Poor countries may indeed face a 
higher risk of conflict, while conflict 
impoverishes countries at the same time. 
It is thus not easy to know whether the 
poverty-conflict nexus comes from pov-
erty breeding war or alternatively from 
war destroying the economy. To solve this 
methodological issue, University of Berke-
ley-based economists wrote a fascinating 
pioneer contribution on this question.18 
Making use of random variations in rain-
fall in African countries during the past 
decades, they were able to isolate random 
variations in economic growth created by 
Mother Nature. Put differently, bad rain-
fall shocks in rural regions, where the 
bulk of economic activity is still in the 
primary sector, drive down the productiv-
ity and the attractiveness of farming com-
pared to outside options such as enrolling 
in a rebel army. They found indeed that 
when lack of rain dried out economic 
growth, the risk of civil conflict increased 
substantially. This link between rain and 
conflict has been studied and used in vari-
ous sequential contributions.
The Story Does Not End There:  
The Role of Persistence, Young Men, 
and Mountains
Some other factors have also been found 
to matter substantially for political vio-
lence.19 First of all, wars tend to repro-
duce themselves, where one war often 
already plants the seeds for the next one. 
This was most famously the case for 
World War II, which many view as a kind 
of follow-up conflict with roots in World 
War I, or for the Second Congo War, 
which was directly linked to the previous 
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First Congo War. Indeed, over two-thirds 
of conflict outbreaks in the second half of 
the 20th century took place in countries 
having experienced multiple wars. Typical 
cases of countries with a string of wars 
taking place one after the other include 
Sudan, Pakistan, Iraq, or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). The underly-
ing reasons include both the persistent 
presence of risk factors (e.g. past wars 
fueled by oil, and oil being still present in 
the country), but also the dynamics of 
vicious cycles (e.g. wars destroy physical, 
human, and social capital, and poorer 
countries with lower education and less 
social cohesion suffer from a greater con-
flict risk). 
Moreover, demographics and geography 
matter: The presence of a large propor-
tion of young men (as percentage of total 
population) has been found to be a risk 
factor, especially in the absence of well-
functioning labor markets and missing 
prospects for a prosperous future. Fur-
ther, conflicts have over-proportionally 
often hit states with a large share of 
mountainous terrain, with a major reason 
for this being the opportunities for hiding 
grounds for rebel groups.
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The risk factors listed above are all things 
that are hard to change for governments 
and the international community. This 
could result in the false impression that 
we are facing a terrible fatality of wars 
being unavoidable and hitting mankind 
periodically like the Beatles’ “Maxwell’s 
Silver Hammer.” Indeed, in popular cul-
ture wars are often portrayed as inescap-
able phenomena inexorably linked to 
human existence. Think, for example, of 
the famous French hit of Nino Ferrer, 
“Le Sud”, expressing well this fatalist 
feeling: “There will have to be a war 
someday // we know that well // we don’t 
like it but we don’t know what to do // 
we say that it is destiny.” Is war indeed 
an inevitable destiny? The answer is a 
clear “no.” Several institutional and pol-
icy choices of states can drastically reduce 
the risk of conflict, as discussed below.
Democracy, Power Sharing, and the 
Rule of Law
As far as interstate wars are concerned, 
democracy is a dream weapon against 
fighting. Drawing on the ideas put for-
ward by Immanuel Kant in his work 
“Perpetual Peace,” there has been a 
vibrant literature in the last decades, 
arguing that democratic states have 
smaller incentives to engage in wars with 
rival powers.20 This follows the logic that 
if those who have to bear the costs (i.e., 
the citizens) decide on war and peace, 
they are likely to side against the former 
and in favor of the latter. This theory has 
been subject to much empirical scrutiny 
and statistical tests. It has been found 
that this argument of universal suffrage 
doing the job of preventing war can only 
be part of the story, as democracies are 
not much less likely to attack autocracies 
than non-democratic states are. Think for 
example of the interventions of the US in 
What Government Can Do: Get
the Institutions and Policies Right
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. However, a 
very strong statistical result is that 
democracies are much less likely to attack 
each other. Put differently, if both coun-
tries of a given country pair are democra-
cies they are very unlikely to engage in 
armed confrontation. Indeed, past inter-
state wars in the very vast majority of 
cases have included at least one non-dem-
ocratic state. The fact that democracy 
only boosts international peace in combi-
nation with facing another democracy, 
points out that the mechanism cannot be 
solely about universal suffrage, but may 
also be about democratic norms and cul-
ture, or about structural and institutional 
constraints. 
In contrast, the picture is less clear-cut 
for civil wars, and democracy appears to 
be a double-edged sword. While democ-
racy indeed goes in hand with prosperity 
and peace in many countries, such as the 
OECD member states, the direction of 
causality is not clear. It is unclear if 
democracy really causes peace, or if there 
are underlying factors simultaneously 
affecting the likelihood of democracy and 
peace (e.g., good social norms and cohe-
sion favoring both democracy and peace). 
Furthermore, there are many instances of 
electoral violence (e.g., in Kenya in 2007, 
Nigeria in 2007 or Ivory Coast in 2010) 
or of large-scale massacres breaking out 
right after the creation of nascent democ-
racy. This was the case not only in 
Rwanda, where the 1994 genocide fol-
lowed timid steps towards democratiza-
tion, but also in Sudan, as well as in the 
Balkans, where steps towards democrati-
zation went hand in hand with ethnic 
cleansings after the Fall of Berlin Wall at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Michael 
Mann, a sociologist from UCLA, has 
documented many such events and even 
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refers to the “dark side of democracy.” 
According to the theory of “Strategic 
Mass Killings”21 this – at first sign para-
doxical – nexus between nascent democ-
racy and massacres can be accounted for 
by the fact that when democratic elec-
tions become imminent, people start to 
realize that the relative size of ethnic 
groups will matter for the future distribu-
tion of power (e.g., group sizes did not 
play any role under Marshal Tito’s iron 
rule, as power was concentrated at the 
top anyway). When ruthless ethnic par-
ties realize that their share of the “cake” 
depends on the size of rival groups and 
that democracy will in the medium run 
rule out discrimination, they may have 
incentives for substituting discrimination 
with elimination and killing large num-
bers of co-citizens from other groups. 
This grim logic is unfortunately also well 
documented in the data. Does this mean 
that democracy is a bad thing, and 
should be avoided? No, by no means. 
Democracy always remains a very desir-
able goal to aspire to. Simply, policy 
makers and the international community 
cannot afford the naive view that once 
elections are run, everything will be fine. 
Nascent democracy, especially in 
resource-rich countries with ethnic cleav-
ages, bears some pitfalls and risks, and 
requires international support and peace-
keepers. 
Interestingly, the virtues and risks linked 
to democracy depend on the level of 
development in a given country.22 A 
rationale for democracy, over and above 
the intrinsic desirability of democracy, is 
that by making the government more 
accountable, citizens will have less cause 
for violent opposition. However, account-
ability may curtail some government 
strategies that are effective in maintaining 
security. For example, unconstrained by 
accountability, both Stalin and Saddam 
Hussein were able to maintain (a horrible 
form of) political stability through 
intense repression despite manifest rea-
sons for popular grievance. In both soci-
eties, more democratic successor 
governments have faced more violence 
because accountability to the law has 
limited what security services are permit-
ted to do. Democracy hence makes the 
use of repression much harder, which 
potentially can more than fully offset 
accountability, so that democracy 
increases the risk of violence. While the 
relative potency of these opposing effects 
of democracy is ambiguous a priori, 
empirical research suggests that the 
accountability effect becomes more 
potent as income rises. This is for various 
reasons: First, as income increases, the 
structure of the economy changes with a 
rising share of government spending. 
This is likely to enhance the importance 
of the positive accountability effect of 
democracy, since accountability typically 
increases the efficiency of government 
spending. A second change in the struc-
ture of a booming economy is that the 
share of primary commodities and natu-
ral resources declines. This is important 
because resource abundance generates – 
as described above – “looting” opportu-
nities, which are one motivation for 
rebellion. If “loot-seeking” rather than 
low accountability is the predominant 
motivation for rebellion at low levels of 
income, enhanced accountability due to 
democracy may have little effect. Finally, 
as income increases, individual prefer-
ences tend to change. The “instrumental” 
goal of material reward becomes less 
important relative to the more abstract 
goals of ideology and identity. Hence, 
“loot-seeking” opportunities will become 
less valued relative to accountability: a 
lack of democracy will be more resented 
at higher levels of income. An implication 
of each of the mechanisms described 
above is that the conflict-reducing 
accountability effect of democracy 
becomes more powerful as income rises. 
The literature on conflict has also high-
lighted the specific effects of particular 
institutions. The basic logic is that insti-
tutions that lower the stakes of control-
ling the government can reduce the risk 
of conflict: When an institution or policy 
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makes gaining control of the government 
less important, then unsurprisingly rebels 
are less willing to fight hard to win 
power. Unfortunately, the importance of 
holding political power has been vital for 
a group’s survival in many countries with 
recent civil wars. Think of the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994. The Hutu Interaha-
mwe troops holding power massacred 
Tutsi citizens over the period of 100 days, 
with the UN and international commu-
nity hesitant to intervene. The genocide 
was ultimately stopped by the battlefield 
victory of the Tutsi-backed Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) rebel army. In this 
case, the stakes of holding or lacking 
power for the Tutsi rebels was life or 
death. It is not always as blunt, but the 
stakes of power in many contexts are 
large indeed. Ethnic favoritism has been 
found to be very widespread around the 
world. One example that made the head-
lines was the case of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC)’s dictator 
Mobutu Sese Seko, whose hometown 
Gbadolite was literally showered in 
money and extravagant infrastructure 
projects. But such famous examples are 
only the point of the iceberg. There is 
large-scale systematic evidence that the 
leader’s home regions and ethnic groups 
fare best in terms of transfers and public 
spending, and that having access to polit-
ical power has in many countries very 
real implications on prosperity.23
However, there are a number of institu-
tions and policies that demonstrably 
lower the differences between being in 
office and being in opposition. The insti-
tutions and policies described below, such 
as proportional representation, federal-
ism, power-sharing and coalition govern-
ment, bicameralism, direct democracy, 
and the Rule of Law, all have the same 
impact of lowering the welfare difference 
between those holding electoral majori-
ties and the others. These institutions 
thereby reduce the stakes of winning elec-
tions and hence the incentives for taking 
up the arms after losing at the polls (see 
box on page 19). 
The first feature of democracy that has 
received considerable attention is propor-
tional representation. With proportional 
representation, even ethnic minority 
groups are assured of obtaining their fair 
share of parliamentary seats and political 
power. If the ethnic minority is less disen-
franchised, it also has lower incentives to 
break with the state and aim for seces-
sion by the sword. Unsurprisingly, it has 
been found that proportional representa-
tion is a particularly powerful antidote 
against turmoil in ethnically and reli-
giously polarized societies with few large 
population groups facing each other.24 
The Westminster model of “first past the 
post” works well in relatively homoge-
nous countries like Australia or New 
Zealand, or in countries where ethnic 
groups have distinct non-overlapping ter-
ritories – the UK, with Wales and Scot-
land being distinct regions. However, 
when there are multiple groups sharing a 
given territory, it is important to make 
sure that each group is properly repre-
sented. Think of Switzerland, which after 
the 1847 civil war was deeply divided 
into Catholics and Protestants, and 
which contains various cantons that have 
strong population shares belonging to 
both religions. In this setting, the choice 
of proportional representation was a nat-
ural one.
Another way of splitting power and 
empowering ethnic or religious minori-
ties is decentralization and federalism. 
This is a particularly powerful device 
when different groups each have separate 
geographical homelands. The underlying 
logic is simple: Given that many realms 
of state prerogatives are shifted to the 
regional and local level, minority groups 
are less affected by national policies they 
might disapprove of. It is less worthwhile 
for minority groups to bear costs of 
secessionist conflict when the stakes are 
lower (i.e., even when not splitting, they 
can do by and large what they want). 
Suppose that the Italian-speaking Swiss 
canton of Ticino had preferences not 
always in line with the rest of Switzer-
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The electoral systems of democracies can be 
classified into two types. First, there is propor-
tional representation, which allows parties to 
be represented according to their vote share. In 
particular, a given number of seats are distrib-
uted to competing parties proportionally to the 
number of votes obtained. In its purest form, for 
example, if there are 20 seats in a constituency 
(e.g., a county, or province) and if a party gains 
20% of the votes, it is allocated 4 seats. This 
contrasts sharply with the “Westminster” type 
of majoritarian representation where the winner 
takes all. In this case, the 20 seats of a constitu-
ency are all attributed to the winning party, leav-
ing no mandates for the runner-ups. A variety of 
mixed systems also exists.
Proportional representation can indeed be a 
powerful rampart to the tyranny of the major-
ity, as illustrated by the following example. 
Think of a country with a majority ethnic 
In majority electoral systems, the 
winning candidate is the individual 
who gets a majority (over 50%) of 
the votes cast (e.g., one of the 50 
states in the USA).
Proportional versus Majoritarian Represen-
tation in Democracies
group amounting to 60% of the population 
that is evenly spread in the territory, and with 
a second ethnic group corresponding to 40% 
of the population also evenly present in all 
districts. Suppose as well that there are two 
political parties with ethnic base represent-
ing the interests of their corresponding ethnic 
group (think for example of the Flemish par-
ties in Belgium, the Scottish Independence 
party or the HDP in Turkey). In such a setting, 
Westminster majoritarian representation may 
yield in each electoral district a narrow victory 
of 60% to 40% for the party linked to the eth-
nic majority and the other one would leave the 
polls empty handed, having zero parliamen-
tary representation despite being the favored 
choice of 40% of the population. In contrast, 
with proportional representation roughly 40% 
of parliamentary seats would be allocated to 
the second ethnic group, leading to a much 
more balanced parliament.
Source: Own design
The winner takes it all.
Proportional representation systems seek to closely 
match a political party’s vote share with its seat alloca-
tion in the legislature. These systems are not based on 
single-member constituencies (e.g., a voting district 
"canton" in Switzerland). Citizens generally vote for 
more than one candidate or for a political party.
In %  Number of votes per party in a particular voting district
100
80
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0
Fig. 5  Impact of Election Outcome in Different Systems (Example)
Party A Party B  Party C
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land. In a completely centralized system 
à la française, this canton may have 
incentives to consider secession, while in 
the current, very federalist and decentral-
ized Swiss constitution, the largest share 
of taxes and the most important policies 
are linked to the regional and local level. 
While Ticinese may not always agree 
with Berne, they know that most of their 
tax money is spent locally and region-
ally, and that they have control of most 
key policies such as education, health, 
and social assistance. This very federalist 
system allows places with a taste for 
large Welfare states (e.g., Geneva) to co-
exist in the same country with places 
preferring slim states and limited redis-
tribution (e.g. Zug), yielding a very het-
erogeneous – yet peaceful country. 
Federalist devolution and regional auton-
omy have been widely and successfully 
used to diffuse tensions in the Basque 
country, Catalonia, Scotland, Wales, or 
Flemish Belgium to name a few. More-
over, the Swiss federalist constitution of 
1848, born in the ruins of the civil war, 
has played the federalist card to ensure a 
large political autonomy for the core 
Catholic cantons of central Switzerland, 
reducing their incentives to seek a 
revenge war later on. 
In addition, power sharing in the govern-
ment through grand coalitions and in the 
administration are powerful means for 
limiting the scope for conflict. There is 
systematic evidence on a large scale for 
a sizable number of countries that co-
opting minorities in the government and 
making them benefit from a share of 
political power can deter rebellion and 
separatism.25 After the turmoils of the 
Swiss civil war in the 19th century, coali-
tion governments were rapidly formed, 
integrating first the Catholic minority 
representatives of the Christian-Demo-
crat party, and later on the socialists. All 
major parties have been represented in 
the Swiss government for decades, which 
has typically always contained represen-
tatives from the Catholic homelands and 
Protestant regions (i.e., which was tradi-
tionally the main source of division), and 
from French-speaking as well as German-
speaking cantons (i.e., the more salient 
division in recent decades). In such a sys-
tem, the implications of winning or los-
ing elections are very small for different 
population groups, as they will be repre-
sented in the government anyway, where 
changes in the share of ministerial posts 
for different parties occur very slowly. 
The “Swiss way” of warranting peace in a 
very heterogeneous country has recently 
also been applied to Northern Ireland. 
This region of the UK has suffered from 
political violence for many decades, trig-
gered in part by grievances from the 
Catholic population about underrepresen-
tation and disenfranchisement. Indeed, 
Protestant Loyalists have traditionally 
dominated the political elite, the adminis-
tration, and the police. The Good Friday 
agreement of 1998 championed large-
scale power sharing, not only confined to 
the parliament, but also to the adminis-
tration and the police, driving down dras-
tically the number of killings that took 
place in the “Troubles.”
Other political institutions follow a simi-
lar logic of protecting minorities against 
the risk of a tyranny of the majority and 
reducing the stakes of winning versus los-
ing elections: For example, bicameralism 
(making it harder to pass through extreme 
bills, especially when the two chambers 
are of different composition), and direct 
democracy (especially referendums, giving 
veto power to minority groups).
Another important aspect for preventing 
conflict is the Rule of Law and a political 
system with separation of power and 
checks and balances.26 Executive con-
straints, contract protection, freedom 
from expropriation and reliable bureau-
cracy play key roles. Having constitution-
ally guaranteed civil rights and liberties 
protects individuals from arbitrary poli-
cies from the state and decreases the costs 
of having an undesired government. 
While some citizens may strongly oppose 
21
In Switzerland, a country with several divisions 
(Catholics versus Protestants, four language 
regions, rural versus urban areas), a political 
system has emerged that puts much weight on 
giving veto power to a large number of groups. 
Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy, 
with the parliament being composed of a 
lower house with 200 members of parliament 
representing the Swiss population, while the 
46 member strong upper house represents the 
cantons. Each “full” canton has two seats in 
the upper house, leading to a strong over- 
representation of the least populous cantons.
Photo: © appenzell.ch
some policies an elected government 
champions, the Rule of Law limits the 
harm they can personally experience, and 
hence reduces the benefits of joining a 
rebel movement to overthrow the govern-
ment. Well-treated citizens are less likely 
to take up the arms. 
Besides these institutional variables, state 
policies that reduce the vulnerability of 
potential rebel recruits can also play an 
important role. For example, certain 
social policies may be able to increase the 
opportunity cost of leaving legality and 
joining the armed fight. Education plays 
a particularly important role.
Education
Empirical evidence exists for a variety of 
countries showing that higher education 
is indeed associated with a lower conflict 
risk.27 The basic underlying logic of link-
ing education to peace is simple:28 Spend-
ing a sizeable share of the state budget on 
education not only has a direct effect of 
increasing productivity, but in addition 
has the potential to reduce the risk of 
harmful conflict that jeopardizes eco-
A unique feature of the Swiss government is 
that it is modelled following the ancient French 
“directoire” system from 1795–1799. In par-
ticular, the executive arm of the Swiss govern-
ment consists of seven ministers with a rotating 
presidency where every year another minister 
takes on the role of president as primus inter 
pares. All major parties are represented in 
this government and its party composition 
has been extremely slow moving in the past de-
cades. Importantly, the linguistic minorities are 
guaranteed a minimum of two or more seats.
Another unique aspect of the Swiss system is 
the strong role played by direct democracy. A 
popular referendum can be launched against 
new articles in the Constitution, requiring 
50’000 signatures to trigger a popular vote on 
the matter. Similarly, the system includes the 
instrument of the popular plebiscite propos-
ing a new article to the Constitution (needing 
100’000 signatures to come to vote). The Swiss 
system is also characterized by a very federal-
ist structure and large decentralization (with 
more than half of the tax revenues going to 
local and cantonal authorities). 
This system implies that political power is 
diluted to a multitude of groups and that most 
reforms are – while not always rapidly decided 
and implemented – broadly supported com-
promises benefitting from the support of large 
parts of the population.
The Swiss Political System
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nomic growth. Intuitively, education 
spending makes people more productive, 
and hence on average better paid. This in 
turn increases the opportunity cost of 
foregone production in war. A highly 
paid university graduate has more to lose 
when quitting the job for joining rebel-
lion than an unemployed person with 
low education and bad perspectives in 
the formal economy. While the Nazi 
party had already  filled up some of their 
ranks with people left out by the society 
and economically and socially marginal-
ized, this recruitment strategy has also 
been recently taken on by the Islamic 
State. By pushing up general education 
levels and career chances, it makes it 
harder for rebellion movements and 
other armed groups to recruit fighters 
cheaply and easily. 
Further, human capital is less easily 
appropriable than money spent else-
where. If, for example, a resource-rich 
country deposits the oil manna in a Sov-
ereign Wealth Fund, or transfers funds to 
cronies, the windfall money is still pres-
ent somewhere in liquid form, and the 
perspective of getting at this honey pot 
may well incite armed rebellion. 
Finally, education may also be able to 
transmit civic values of peace. If educa-
tion aims to foster civic understanding, 
tolerance, and scientific thinking, it can 
shape the mindset of pupils in a positive 
way, making them less receptive for hate 
messages and calls for violence.
Social Capital and Inter-Ethnic Trade
Another crucial rampart against political 
violence is the building of a society with 
tolerant social norms and high levels of 
trust and social capital. In fact, war con-
tinues to destroy society even when the 
guns have ceased shooting and bombs 
have stopped dropping. The reason is 
that war unleashes a terrible vicious 
cycle.29 The first step is that mistrust 
grows after war. While some wars may 
arise due to miscoordination – where no 
one actively pushed for armed conflict – 
hawkish attitudes of the parties involved 
may trigger wars in many cases. While 
the intentions and attitudes are some-
times hard to discern, it is a fair guess for 
fighting parties that the opponent, with 
at least some probability, had a hawkish 
attitude and bad intensions in the escala-
tion leading to war. And hawks today 
may well be hawks again tomorrow. 
Hence, once bitten twice shy; and the dif-
ferent groups involved are reluctant to 
fully trust past opponents in post-war 
reconstruction. This has severe conse-
quences, as trade requires trust, and thus 
trade and business between former adver-
saries very often collapses after war. This 
unintended consequence of conflict has 
been observed at various times in the 
data, for example in Rwanda, where 
mutual trust has been recorded to be sub-
stantially lower after fighting episodes 
and where inter-ethnic business associa-
tions and cooperation have (unsurpris-
ingly) plummeted after fighting. A sharp 
decrease in inter-ethnic trust and a sub-
stantial surge in ethnic identity have also 
been recorded in Uganda during the first 
years of the new millennium in the dis-
tricts hit hardest by president Museveni’s 
“Iron Fist” military offensive against the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).30
Low trust is very persistent over time; 
even long-gone wars hall back today: 
There is systematic evidence that Europe-
wide trust between countries correlates 
very strongly with the past wars in the 
last centuries, and that there is a big loss 
in trade after hostilities.31 For example, 
the relatively low Anglo-French trust – 
persisting even today – is in line with the 
fact that these countries have fought doz-
ens of battles in the Middle Ages, even 
though the last major bilateral war ended 
in 1815 at Waterloo.
To close the vicious cycle, when bilateral 
trade with a given group or country is 
low, the opportunity cost of attacking is 
much lower compared to a situation 
where strong business ties exist. Thus, in 
sum, conflict drives down trust and inter-
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group trade, which makes groups less 
economically dependent on each other 
and implies that they have less to lose 
from a renewed attack in the future. Poli-
cies abating cultural barriers and foster-
ing inter-ethnic trade can reduce the 
incidence of conflict, while coercive peace 
policies, such as peacekeeping forces or 
externally imposed regime changes, have 
no enduring effects, as they do not foster 
positive inter-group interaction, which is 
the best way to rebuild trust and inter-
dependence. The most important exam-
ple of building up trust and business in 
the aftermath of a terrible war was the 
creation of first the European Coal and 
Steel Community and then the European 
Union in war-torn Europe after World 
War II. The policy of bottom-up coopera-
tion and small steps led ultimately to 
refueling depleted trust and making 
European countries increasingly interde-
pendent, which has led to peace in West-
ern Europe for the past seven decades. 
As the renowned American sociologist 
Charles Tilly shows, Europe was a 
hotspot of violence and conflict during 
the medieval period (which incidentally 
favored state formation). The increased 
interdependence during the last seven 
decades has led to one of the longest 
spells of uninterrupted peace in this 
One of the most important examples of build-
ing of trust and business in the aftermath of a 
terrible war was the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in war-torn Europe 
after World War II. 
The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schu-
man (in the middle of the picture, holding the 
signed ECSC treaty), in his famous declara-
tion of 9 May 1950, proposed that Franco-
German coal and steel production be placed 
under a common High Authority within the 
framework of an organisation in which other 
European countries could participate.
The Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in 
Paris on 18 April 1952 by Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It entered 
into force for a 50-year period. Members of 
the European Parliamentary Assembly were 
selected by their national parliaments. The 
Assembly had the right to dismiss the High 
Authority (precursor to today's Commission).
Picture above: Signing cerem-
ony of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 
Paris, 1952. © European Uni-
on, 1952 – Source: European 
Parliament
Picture on the right: Original 
contract of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). 
© Nationaal Archief, Den 
Haag, Kabinet der Koningin 
(1946-1975),
Trust Building in Post-War Europe
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region in recent history, and has trans-
formed Europe into an example of peace 
and prosperity.
Foreign Aid
Can foreign aid help prevent armed con-
flict, for example by combatting poverty? 
There is only very limited data evidence 
available for answering this question. The 
most recent and detailed study on this was 
recently written by a team of scholars 
from the Harvard and Yale Universities.32 
They assessed the impact of US food aid 
on 125 developing countries during the 
last few decades, exploiting random 
shocks in the amount of US-produced 
food available to be shipped as donation 
to countries in need. In fact, the amounts 
of US food aid allocated only depend to a 
limited extent on the actual needs of recip-
ient countries, but are to a large extent 
driven by the previous year’s excess pro-
duction in the US. By shifting surplus food 
abroad, the domestic prices can be kept 
high. The researcher team finds that these 
random spikes in aid availability following 
US overproduction have – if anything – a 
negative effect on political stability in the 
recipient countries, increasing the out-
break risk and potential duration of civil 
wars. This is in line with the same logic as 
that outlined above for the natural 
resource curse. When there is stuff to be 
grabbed, people with bad outside options 
have incentives to form armed groups of 
rebels or roaming bandits and to try to 
engage in rent seeking, appropriating the 
pie up for grab. The sorry tale of US food 
aid and conflict should of course not dis-
credit all forms of foreign aid. While 
indeed dumping valuable stuff without 
much protection may bear risks (as in the 
case of US food aid), other forms of aid 
like technical cooperation or the building 
of schools and hospitals could have very 
different effects.
Military Intervention in Complex  
Conflicts
What about armed intervention? UN or 
international interventions and peace-
keeping efforts do not necessarily mean 
“sending the Navy Seals or other special 
troops”, as done in Somalia, Afghani-
stan, or Iraq. In many cases, an interven-
tion can also imply weapon embargoes, 
buying off rebels by offering government 
jobs, or promoting bilateral reconcilia-
tion between two or more rival groups. 
In a recent research project, a team of 
Zurich- and Lausanne-based scholars 
carried out a novel network analysis 
allowing an answer to these questions.33 
In particular, they have built a new net-
work model of conflict and introduced 
data from the Second Congo War, one of 
the most brutal conflicts in recent his-
tory, resulting in several million fatalities. 
They have found taking alliances and 
rivalries between armed groups into 
account is crucial, to determine which 
groups have the most detrimental effects 
on fueling escalation. These key groups 
are not necessarily the most active groups 
in terms of reported battles in the media, 
but may be relatively discrete – yet well 
connected. Removing these groups from 
the war – either by combatting them mili-
tarily or “bribing” them into laying 
down their arms by offering (govern-
ment) job perspectives – can have a very 
powerful impact on driving down the 
conflict intensity. Arms embargoes are 
hard to enforce and are not found to 
have a key impact on the fighting. In con-
trast, using the fine-grained network of 
group links, one can compute which 
bilateral rivalries are most worthwhile 
pacifying. It turns out that these bilateral 
pacification efforts can be one of the 
most promising policies to combat con-
flict.
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As soon as wars are seen as a fate that 
cannot be avoided, this erroneous proph-
ecy becomes self-fulfilling and the combat 
against conflict is lost. Maybe surpris-
ingly, governments and the international 
community dispose of a vast array of mea-
sures that are able to reduce the risk, 
intensity, or duration of fighting drasti-
cally. Getting the joint economics and pol-
itics right makes a huge difference. The 
worst enemy of peace is poverty. Sound 
macroeconomic policies that promote eco-
nomic growth also display a complemen-
tarity with democracy. The impact of 
democracy is strongest and most positive 
when the economy is thriving. Generally 
speaking, all institutions that reduce the 
stakes of gaining power reduce the risk of 
conflict: Proportional representation, fed-
eralism, power sharing, bicameralism, and 
referenda all protect ethnic and religious 
minority groups and guarantee them 
appropriate representation and freedom of 
choice. They all drive down the gains of 
seeking to overturn the central govern-
ment or pursuing secession by the sword. 
The power sharing and checks and bal-
ances applied by the “Swiss model” at all 
levels (coalition government with rotating 
presidency, bicameral parliament overrep-
resenting small regions, federalism, and 
direct democracy with popular votes) 
could thus well inspire political reforms in 
divided and war-torn societies, and the les-
sons drawn by Switzerland after its civil 
war in 1847 may well still apply today. 
Furthermore, institutions and policies that 
favor trade and the building of trust are 
key ingredients in reducing the conflict 
potential. Further promising policies 
include promoting public education and 
putting in place well-organized pacifica-
tion interventions taking the whole net-
work complexities of a given war into 
account. Trying to prevent war is never 
easy, but the payoffs of peace are so high 
that it is well worth the effort. 
Scientific research can help ease the bur-
den by providing concrete answers to spe-
cific questions about policy effectiveness. 
For example, a direct test of policy inter-
ventions has been confined until recently 
to other fields of economics such as labor 
or taxation. Very recently, however, sev-
eral studies championed by scholars from 
Chicago and Columbia have started evalu-
ating factors that were previously elusive, 
such as reconciliation in the aftermath of 
massacres or the reintegration of former 
child soldiers, with the help of large scale 
studies where participants are randomly 
allocated to a group benefitting from the 
intervention and a comparable control 
group not treated. In Europe as well, the 
role of policies and institutions for curbing 
conflict is receiving increasing attention, 
with the European Research Council 
recently funding research on the impact of 
political institutions, education, and 
health initiatives on promoting peace.34 
For this scientific knowledge to be truly 
useful for policy, a missing puzzle piece is 
the diffusion of scientific results to stake-
holders in politics, business, and the 
administration – which is a main challenge 
for the future and one of the main aims  
of this paper.
Conclusions
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